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T IS SOMEHOW FITTING that Lon Fuller, Carter Professor of Juris-
prudence at the Harvard Law School, the most respectable critic
of Justice Holmes" jurisprudence, provides the means of defend-
ing Holmes' elegant thinking against the onslaughts directed at it.
Not that Holmes needs defense, but it would seem from the attacks
made that his extremely lean thoughts can use some expansion. Pro-
fessor Fuller, by articulating the standard of promoting fidelity to
law,2 for the first time permits an analysis of Holmes not from
philosophical bias, but from the goal the Justice sought. In a nut-
shell, Fuller's thesis is that if there is to be widespread obedience
(efficacy of law), law must embody morality. Although he scrupu-
lously avoids articulating any substantive rules of morality, implicit
in his, and other naturalist jurisprudence, is that the morality the
law must embody is his morality--or to be completely fair, His
morality. It was at this precise point Justice Holmes declined the
logma of naturalism.
Oliver Wendell Holmes believed that law and morality were
intertwined. In the speech to which his severest critics often turn,
Holmes said:
The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its
history is the history of the moral development of the race. The
practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens
and good men.3
However, Holmes, who also knew that the life of the law is ex-
* B.S.C. 1959 and J.D. 1961 DePaul University. Mr. Brody is presently an Assistant
?rofessor of Law at Chicago-Kent College Of Law. The research for this paper was com-
Acted in the pursuit of an LL.M. at Northwestern University College Of Law.
1 Howe, The Positivism Of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 530 (1951). Other,
ess objective, criticism of the Justice's jurisprudence appears in the following: Lucey,
atural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions To A Theory
)f Law In A Democratic Society, 30 Geo. L.J. 493 (1942); Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes And
litler, 31 A.B.A.J. 569 (1945); Palmer, Defense Against Leviathan, 32 A.B.A.J. 328 (1946).
2 Fuller, Positivism And Fidelity To Law-A Reply To Professor Hart, 71 Harv.
Rev. 630 (1958).
3 Holmes, The Path Of The Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).
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perience, not logic, 4 had learned from experience, both personal
and vicarious, that morality is an amorphous, quicksilver, often
quixotic body of ideals. He knew that moral values may, and do
vary, from person to person, especially in an open, pluralistic soci-
ety. Therefore he believed to be effective, i.e., promote a high de-
gree of obedience, the law must avoid all reference to the sundry
propositions of particular moral beliefs. He knew that differences
in moral codes, althought slight, were deeply held and gave rise to
highly emotional disputes.
Professor Howe, in an article on Holmes' jurisprudence,
points out that Catherine Drinker Bowen in Yankee From Olym-
pus painted a misleading picture of the relationship between Jus-
tice Holmes and his father, the irrepressible Doctor Holmes.5
Surely, as Howe writes, a leader of progressive thought of the
stature of Doctor Holmes could not help but impart some of his
distrust of anti-intellectual absolutism to his son. However, Howe's
article overlooks an event in the history of the Holmes family that
gives great insight to Justice Holmes' skepticism. After thirty-seven
years as minister of the First Congregationalist Church of Boston,
Abiel Holmes, the Justice's grandfather was dismissed.6 The schism
which brought about his dismissal developed over a conflict be-
tween the older, strict Calvinists and the Unitarian movement
within the church. Certainly such severe treatment after such de-
voted, able service had to strike deep into a proud family. It had
to effect the moral philosophy of all the members of the family;
and further, it had to influence their evaluation of other moral
philosophies.
Combine familial and paternal distruct of the selfrighteous-
ness of moral absolutism with Justice Holmes' realization of the
wide gap between morality as practiced and morality as articulated,
and the basis of Holmes' skepticism is patent. Holmes' admiration
of Ralph Waldo Emerson is well known, and the philosopher-poet's
influence is certainly great. It is Emerson who in response to the
question, "What is the largest sea in the world?" is popularly said to
4 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1, (1881).
5 Howe, The Positivism Of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 530, 532-536 (1951)
6 C. D. Bowen, Yankee From Olympus 49-51 (1944).
PRAGMATIC NATURALISM OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
have responded, "The sea of blood shed in the name of the Prince
of Peace." Holmes' misgivings for which he is so soundly con-
demned as a cynic, were not directed at law or morals. Rather, as
Emerson's, his doubts were directed at Man's ability and desire,
as witnessed by history, to fulfill the moral codes espoused.
I submit that those who condemn Justice Holmes as a cynic,
share his doubt that man can adhere to a demanding moral code. In
fact, I will venture the thought that the degree to which any critic
shares the Justice's misgivings is directly proportional to the vitu-
peration employed in condemning him. The distinction is simply
that his critics are concerned only that Man cannot adhere to their
moral code; and those critics can, in their supreme righteousness,
absolve individuals for falling short of the mark. On the other
hand, Justice Holmes was convinced that Man could not fulfill any
demanding code, and he was equally certain that it was beyond his
power to forgive this shortcoming. His job, as he saw it, was to live
with the shortcoming and contribute to molding a society that
could cope with it. The condemnation flows then, not from moral
rectitude, but from moral certitude; and it is directed at dissent
rather than immorality.
There is no doubt Mr. Justice Holmes firmly believed that the
efficacy of law depended on something more than the will and physi-
cal power of the government to impose it. However, in searching
for this meta-legal criterion he turned from articulated moral codes
to something equally clear, but more widely shared. He turned to
practiced ideals rather than merely articulated ones. He labelled his
meta-legal phenomenon "social value" rather than morality, and
thereby incurred the everlasting wrath of the moral absolutists. He
displeased them not only because he set forth different criteria of
justice, but also because there is the distinct possibility he has found
a more universally humane one.
Justice Holmes' reference to a standard to which the law itself
must conform shall be demonstrated by analyzing his philosophy as
articulated in The Path Of The Law.7 Then the investigation will
shift to his philosophy as practiced, by scrutinizing the opinions he
7 Holmes, supra note 3.
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wrote in the Court year (September, 1896 through June, 1897)
during which The Path Of The Law was published. 8 (The Justice,
eternally more concerned with what judges did rather than said,
would approve having his ideals scrutinized in the unflattering
light of action.) Both his articulated and practiced ideals will be
analyzed by concentrating on the three major faults of Legal Positi-
vism found by Professor Fuller: 1) Law is a command, 2) enforced
by an uncommanded sovereign and, 3) a dichotomy between law
and morality must be maintained. And so that the analysis of the
critique will remain true to the critique, emphasis will be given to
the separation of law and morals.
II. The Path of the Law
The Law In Quest Of Itself begins by referring to Hobbes'
admonition in the Leviathan to discipline one's mind to reach
objectives. Fuller reaffirms his dedication to purposeful thought by
raising, "Nietzsche's trenchant dictum that the commonest stupid-
ity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do."9 When one reads
criticism of Holmes' jurisprudence, one is confident that his critics
know full well their purpose. However when one then reads what
is being condemned, one is equally certain that Holmes' critics do
not even concede that the Justice was also capable of purposeful
thought. However no one should infer that I consider this inability
to recognize disciplined thought as a subtle form of the stupidity
condemned by Nietzsche. Quite the contrary, I consider it a most
clever dialectic ploy.
As an admirer of both Holmes' judicial and literary talents, I
see a gross injustice in finding it incumbent upon me to expand on
The Path Of The Law. I can cope with this necessity only by the
knowledge that I am not aiding the author, but rather his readers.
One critic separates Holmes' speech into two distinct, and accord-
ing to him, contradictory portions. ° It is with regret that Professor
8 Delivered as a dedication speech at the Boston University School of Law, January
8, 1897. Justice Holmes was, at the time making the address, beginning his fifteenth year
as a Justice of The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (appointed December 15,
1882) and was exactly three months away from his fifty-sixth birthday (March 8, 1841).
There can be no doubt that his philosophy as then set forth was the product of a mature
mind at the pinnacle of its ability.
9 L. Fuller, The Law In Quest Of Itself 41 (1966).
10 Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1951).
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Henry Hart found it necessary to see two Holmeses-the one who
advocated the separation of law from morality and the other who
condemned judges and lawyers for not considering the "social
value" of a law. However, the schizophrenia Hart bemoaned did
not exist. Read with the same discipline with which it was written,
The Path Of The Law discloses a viable unity of thought. Holmes
brought both the precision and consistency of his Yankee heritage
to his jurisprudence. To fully understand The Path Of The Law
one must dissect it, concentrate one's scrutiny on each part, but at
all times keep in mind the total thrust of the thoughts. One must
realize that at any given moment one is viewing only a part of a
whole and the worth of that part has meaning only in its relation-
ship to the whole. To do otherwise, is an attempt to choose Miss
America by studying the soles of her feet. A philosophy, as a wo-
man, is more than the sum of its parts.
A. The "Is" and the "Ought"
Contemporary naturalists condemn Holmes' attempt to sep-
arate the is of the law from the ought of the law. They believe that
a statute or rule of law is not a segment of being, but, . .. "a
process of becoming."" However this indictment does not lie, be-
cause Holmes would be the first to agree that a rule of law is a
process of becoming. In fact, he would not limit the application
of this truth to a particular statute, as do the naturalists, but would
apply it to the law as an entirety (the Law, with a capital "L"-if
you will). The Justice's admonition to study history, which com-
prises a significant portion of the article, is the ultimate recognition
of the evolutionary quality of the law. Therefore, the attempt to
characterize Holmes' desire to see the law as it "is" as proof of his
failure to see law as a dynamic, as opposed to static phenomenon,
must fall before his own words in the very article under attack. It
is precisely because Justice Holmes did see the law as a "process of
becoming" that he urged separating the is from the ought.
It is on this issue of separating the is from the ought that
Holmes' critics elect to ignore his ability to reason with a specific
11 L. Fuller, supra note 9 at 10.
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objective in mind. Holmes was speaking to law students and mem-
bers of the bar who desire, "(A) right study and mastery of the law
as a business with well understood limits, a body of dogma enclosed
within limits."'21 He was speaking to men who would make their liv-
ings advising and representing clients at one stage, or during one
era, of the evolution. He wanted them to do it well so they would
be successful and hopefully, as he makes so clear in what Hart con-
siders the inconsistent second half, so that justice would be rend-
ered.
What one must keep in mind is that Holmes was in equal
measure a man of thought and deed. He was not satisfied to merely
know something was just; his nature drove him to strive for it. As
an action oriented philosopher, he realized that to accomplish an
end one must, of course, have that end (the highest principle) firmly
in mind, and of equal importance, one must know exactly where
one stands in relation to achieving that end. The flaw in Holmes'
critics is their belief that in articulating the goal they have attained
it. In law as in every human undertaking, Holmes knew what his
critics have yet to learn,-wishing will not make it so. The diffi-
culty in escaping from a maze is not that one does not know one
is trapped; nor is it that one does not know that there is some exit
from it. The problem is determining exactly where one is located
in relation to that exit.
Implicit in the naturalist condemnation of Holmes' positivism
is the belief that the advocacy of ignoring morality is a complete
denial of higher principle or ends. But such could not be further
from the truth. Holmes had ends firmly in mind; these ends are
what he had in mind when he spoke of "social value." Separating
the is from the ought is not an end in itself, as the naturalists would
have us believe, but rather merely a means of achieving an end-
the perfection or purification of the law. Therefore, the first half of
the Path does not conflict with the second, but rather is a means
of achieving it.
Moreover, Holmes specifically decried the confusion of law
and morals when he spoke to law students pursuing an even more
specific objective. He wanted them to be able to make accurate ap-
12 Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
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proximations of the point to which the law had to date developed.
This was reflective of his awareness of the gap between creed and
deed. In mastering the present state of the law, Holmes did not
want the young scholars to be, "all bleeding heart and no bloody
head." To ignore the gap and try to "know the law" as if morality
and law were at each and every moment inextricably intertwined
would be to study the aspirations of Man when one was seeking the
acts of Man. Remember, Holmes was at this point of the speech
addressing students of and future practitioners in an adversary
procedure. He was not speaking to judges or professors who are to
function as disinterested, detached and objective arbiters of justice.
Later when speaking of judges and lawyers as officers of the
law molding a meaningful legal system, he most explicitly artic-
ulates the necessity for the confluence of law and some higher
principle. However, he still maintains that the clear line between
law and the higher goals law seeks, must be retained. Because how
can one assess whether the law conforms to morality if one assumes
that law and morality are identical? How can one begin to work free
from the maze of injustice if one believes he is not caught within
it, but rather sees oneself in the vast openness of revealed truth?
How can one determine whether law conforms to the highest prin-
ciples of society unless one knows what those principles are, knows
what law is and compares each to the other? Something cannot be
compared with itself. The very nature of comparison assumes a
plurality of subjects. While perfection of law is the goal of both
Holmes and his critics, the latter will never achieve it if they begin
their quest by assuming they have finished. Perfection is an end,
not a beginning. Wendell Holmes, the activist, knew this, so Justice
Holmes, the philosopher, said it. It may be rare that a man be both
philosopher and activist; however, the traits are neither mutually
exclusive nor inconsistent.
B. Law is a Command
The next seemingly effective criticism levelled at Holmes'
philosophy has been that he and other Positivists consider law a
command.13 Closely read, the criticism reveals itself as an objection
13 Disparaging relativism, and thus revealing himself as one who in fact viewed law
as a command, one of Holmes' severest critics said:
Philosophically belief in absolutes, universals, objective standards, a universal idea
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to, or at least a questioning of, the theory of legislative supremacy
in a government where a separation of powers exists. The natural-
ists are concerned that by considering law as a command, positivist
courts will default to the legislative branch, the authority to enact
unjust or immoral laws. Although they do not say so in so many
words, the naturalists seem to opt for judicial supremacy. I think
the reason they do not come right out and say so is because they
realize that judicial supremacy is subject to the identical abuses that
legislative supremacy is. Unarticulated in both positions is a fear of
supremacy, regardless of which branch reigns.
However, it is incorrect to believe Holmes thought the judi-
ciary could not negate an act of the legislature. Implicit, if not
explicit, in his desire to have judges consider the social value of a
law is the belief that judges can set aside a law enacted by the legis-
lature, but which has no social value. If judges could not negate
an act of the legislature for failure to conform to a meta-legal stan-
dard, why should they consider such a standard? If judges could not
negate legislative acts on the basis of social value, the only extra-
legal standards essential to the judiciary would be a dictionary and
a grammar primer. He urged lawyers as well as judges to consider
the social value of a law-lawyers so they could call judges' atten-
tion to this aspect of a law; and judges so they could overturn legis-
lation having either no social effects or negative social effects.
Contrary to popular belief it is not the positivists, but the natural-
ists with their drive for absolutism who must find a supreme,
"uncommanded commander." Who other than an omnipotent
commander can make laws so absolute all must follow? Holmes had
no difficulty with the knowledge that the judicial and the legislative
branches two-thirds of sovereignty. He was content that neither was
supreme, but both were required.
The unkindest cut of all the injustices done Holmes comes
about through this criticism. The dual erroneous beliefs that
Holmes thought the judicial could not countermand the legislative
of being, was replaced by a view of the world as a chaos of phenomena and by
subjectivism. With no recognized authority one man's opinion was as good as
another's; what he thought was as likely to be true as what you thought.
Palmer, Defense Against Leviqthan, 32 A.B.A.J. 328, 330 (1946).
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and thus that he considered law a command, were subtly shifted
from a discussion of the intragovernmental system of checks and
balances to a discussion of the relationship of the individual to his
government. By setting the discussion of "law as command" in this
new arena, it became an easy task for his critics to portray Holmes,
one of the original judicial civil libertarians, as an advocate of
totalitarianism. Nothing is, or could be, further from the truth.
The only way such a distorted conclusion can be reached is the way
it was done. Begin by disregarding what is being studied, then fail
to understand what is said and finally, take those uncomprehended
thoughts and apply them to an entirely different subject.
Nowhere in the Path is Holmes speaking of the relationship
between citizen and State. Nowhere does he say an individual must
obey a law which fails to meet meta-legal criteria. To the contrary,
patent in his admonition to judges to assess the social value of a law
is the belief that citizens disobedient to a law with no or negative
social value should go unpunished. Why else would he have judges
consider a meta-legal criterion, if not to have them refrain from
punishing individuals who violated laws falling short of such a
standard?
Professor Howe, defending Justice Holmes, says that those
who accuse Holmes of totalitarianism rely on one of the Justice's
speeches where he said:
I do not know what is true. I do not know the meaning of the
universe. But in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds,
there is one thing I do not doubt, that no man who lives in the
same world with most of us can doubt, and that is that the faith
is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life
in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little
understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no notion,
under tactics of which he does not see the purpose. 14
Professor Howe then goes on to explain that any one who is
at all familiar with Holmes' life would know the Justice was not
setting forth a despot's creed, but was merely articulating the dis-
may and disillusionment of a mature man whose youth witnessed
slaughter in the name of cause. As correct as Professor Howe is,
he is too kind. Those who would condemn Holmes on the basis
14 Howe, supra note 3, at 532; citing Holmes, Speeches 59 (1913).
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of the above passage miss the mark in both character judgment
and grammar. The subject of Mr. Justice Holmes sentence and
praise is not obedience, but faith. The faith in one's government,
the faith in one's cause, the faith in one's freedom, even the faith
which causes one to risk his life to free the Holy Land from the
infidel-that faith is true and adorable. What is done and obeyed
in the name of that beautiful faith is grotesque, and is precisely
why Holmes rejected blind, beautiful faith for the rational eval-
uation of social worth.
C. The Value of an Idea
A lesser criticism of legal positivism is that in its emphasis on
the sanction as a tool of promoting obedience, positivism ignores
the acceptability of an idea as a means of fostering compliance
with itself. 15 Even this seemingly tangential criticism is inap-
propriately directed at The Path Of The Law. Holmes concluded
by saying:
To an imagination of any scope the most far-reaching form of
power is not money, it is the command (of) ideas .... Read the
works of the great German jurists, and see how much more the
world is governed to-day by Kant than by Bonaparte. 16
In his eloquent way, Mr. Justice Holmes clearly states that
the power of an idea is demonstrably superior to that of force.
Further, the same words may be used to head off any attempt to
characterize the Justice's concern for those who make their living
at the law, as a cynic's view of a most honorable profession. Ever
the acceptor of life as it is, Holmes recognized the economics of
practice yet he urged that economics are not only of secondary
importance, but counseled that profit provides only secondary
satisfaction.
D. The Bad-Man Test
Another concept expressed in the Path that Holmes' critics
have chosen to misconstrue is the so-called bad-man test. Here
again their error flows from an unwillingness to see the objective
Holmes sought. Too strongly committed to establishing Natural-
15 L. Fuller, supra note 9, at 91 and 115.
16 Holmes, supra note 3, at 478.
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ist theory, they equated this test-merely one means to an end-
with the end itself. To place the bad-man test in its proper con-
text and thereby examine the totality of Holmes' jurisprudence,
not just parts of it, I shall retread The Path Of The Law. How-
ever, Holmes' goals will be kept uppermost in mind. Hopefully
the outline form used will aid, not oversimplify the organization of
the Justice's thoughts.
I. The goal of the legal profession is to make laws conform to
and achieve the "social values" of the civilization.
A. To accomplish this end, the profession must know what it
is the society seeks (474 & 476)
1. To determine what is sought the profession must study
society;
a. as it was (history; pp. 469-474)
b. as it will become-through the study of statistics and
economics (469).
B. After the profession knows from where the society has come
and has discovered where it is society wishes to go, the pro-
fession must next determine exactly where society is on
the journey it has charted for itself.
1. To place society's position with accuracy, the profession
must distinguish between law and morality.
a. one means of making that separation is to view the
law from the perspective of a man who has no
scruples.
Placed in its true relation to the totality of Holmes' philos-
ophy, it is obvious that the bad-man test has been given too prom-
inent a position by the naturalists. Holmes' critics have had to
ignore more than the goals the Justice sought in order to condemn
him as a scofflaw. They have disregarded to whom he was speaking,
and they have ignored other things he said and the way he lived.
Notwithstanding their disregard for these points, the critics
did not see the purpose of the test. Holmes, who understood our
system of checks and balances, knew that the executive branch
shares the sovereignty in our governmental structure. Therefore,
exactly as the judicial must agree that legislation meets meta-legal
criteria, the executive must implement that approved legislation.
In our system, unanimity among the three branches of government
is required for operative law. Looking at the law as a bad man
might, enables the legal practitioner to determine if the requisite
unanimity exists.
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Further, because Holmes knew the link of law and higher
principle, and yet remained aware of the gap between creed and
deed, he realized that the perspective of a bad man could provide a
valuable insight to both law and morality. Laws enacted by the
legislature, approved by the courts but ignored by the executive,
are articulated higher principle which the civilization is unwilling
to practice. Thus, the bad-man test to Holmes is one means to ac-
curately determine the exact extent of the gap, and is the beginning
of the effort to establish the desired identity of the is and the ought.
On the other hand, if one believes as Holmes did, that the
executive is in some way reflective of the desires of the people, who
are the ultimate residuum of sovereignty, then one may further
find the moral beliefs of the people by noting the executive's refusal
to enforce a particular law. For this particular purpose, determin-
ing morality, as opposed to the purpose of learning the law-
Holmes would rely on the relationship of law and morality as he
saw it, "The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral
life." Thus, Holmes believed any law that cannot be enacted by
the legislative, approved or "found" by the judicial and enforced
by the executive evidence a reticence by the People to externalize
the specific moral tenet involved. And further, to a man of Holmes'
integrity, reticence to externalize was strong evidence of a lack of
internal commitment. I offer as testimony of the soundness of
Holmes' thinking the agonizing lack of the required unity in the
law ordering racial integration of the public schools.
Considered from its relation to the whole and recognizing its
intended use discloses that the bad-man test has been over em-
phasized and misunderstood.
E. "Social Value"
This examination of The Path has shown that Holmes was
firmly convinced law must comply with some higher principles.
However, he chose as the most effective meta-legal criteria "social
value" because of his distrust of the emotionalism that generally
surrounds morality. It seems that in choosing "social value" instead
of morality as the meta-legal standard, Holmes created a semantic,
not a real, difference between himself and the naturalists.
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He chose to distinguish "social value" from morality not be-
cause he thought these two standards were essentially exclusive,
but because if there was at some given point any gap between
aspiration and act, the latter would be more widely held. And thus
if the goal sought is effective law by engendering widespread volun-
tary compliance, that goal will be most readily achieved by requir-
ing what those whose obedience is sought are willing to do as
distinguished from what they are willing to discuss. Holmes chose
"social value" not because he was immoral, nor because he felt
society was immoral, but because he believed the law (because of
our political system) reflected the morality society was willing to
practice. He further felt that it would be unwise to demand from
the people a great deal more than they were willing to give. The
law could correct only a degree of the imperfection. As much as
the law might like to, completely closing the gap between creed and
deed perforce fell to professions other than the law. "For most of
the things that properly can be called evils in the present state of
the law I think the main remedy is for us to grow more civilized,"
he said. 7 As much as he might personally be tempted to use the law
as a panacea, he was ever aware that its curative powers could be
completely dissipated by overuse.
If the end is, as Professor Fuller has made clear, efficacy of law
through fidelity to law, Justice Holmes advocated that end. Fur-
ther, he advocated as the naturalists do, that fidelity is best achieved
by requiring laws to conform to some meta-legal criteria. He artic-
ulated a pragmatic meta-legal standard and therefore classifying
him as a Pragmatic Naturalist is not inaccurate.
III. Holmes' opinions Contemporaneous with The Path
During the Court year beginning in September, 1896, and
ending June 27, 1987, Holmes wrote sixty-six opinions in his capac-
ity as a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (see
Appendix). His first opinion was Chase v. Henry" on October
twenty-first and his last of the year Attorney General v. Donohue,19
17 C. D. Bowen, supra note 6, at 352.
18 166 Mass. 577 (1896).
19 169 Mass. 18 (1897).
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on June fifteenth. There are two dissents (#1 8c #13) and twelve
opinions deal with Workman's Compensation situations. The
opinions run the full gamut of legal problems from adultery to
trusts (see Appendix) and appear to be representative of both his
judicial and legal philosophies. The analysis reveals the Justice's
use of a meta-legal criterion and at the same time a belief in judicial
restraint. Holmes believed he had the authority to overrule the
legislature, but he was reluctant to use that authority except in the
worthiest cases. This reluctance resulted from Holmes' distrust of
absolutism, whether that certainty existed in his or someone else's
mind. There has been a tendency on the part of some critics to
equate the Justice's belief that he should not impose his judgment
on the legislature with the belief that he thought he could not do
so. Thus these same critics find his occasional, "eloquent if some-
what vague expression to . .. human aspirations,''2 inconsistent.
This very inconsistency, one critic points out, makes Holmes a
most effective advocate of legal positivism. However, if one dis-
tinguishes between the Justice's conception of the extent of judicial
power from his conception of the responsible exercise of that
power, one will see that Holmes was in fact most consistent. The
Justice held both beliefs, which are not mutually exclusive, and
was consistent to both of them.
A. A Problem
One difficulty in analyzing Justice Holmes' opinions in the
attempt to distill his devotion to a meta-legal criterion is how far
one desires to go. If the analysis confines itself to the language and
holding of the opinion, one conclusion may be reached. If, how-
ever, the investigator pursues the decision to the social effect it
may have, a different conclusion may appear. An example of this
problem is Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport2' (#62).
Briefly stated, the city of Newburyport under enabling legisla-
tion, took the assets of the plaintiff, a private company supplying
water to the city. The difficulty was in setting the price. The statute
provided that the Commissioners setting the price to be paid were
20 L. Fuller, supra note 9, at 117.
21 168 Mass. 541 (1897).
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limited to paying the value of the property to the city, "without
enhancement on account of future earnings capacity or good-
will. . . ." The Court, through Justice Holmes, held that the
plaintiff was entitled to only the actual value of the physical assets
taken.
The approach to interpreting the enabling act, if not positi-
vistic is certainly formalistic. Holmes confines himself to the precise
wording of the statutes to explain his decision. One is impressed
with the meticulous devotion to the legislature's language and gets
the disconcerting (for me anyway) feeling Holmes believed he must
not question the legislature. However, his legal philosophy comes
through his judicial philosophy, when he says:
If capitalizing profits would give a much greater excess over the
value of the land, water easements and plant of the company, than
the Commissioners allowed, the reasons are to be found in the
franchise and monopoly of the company, in the right to lay pipes
in the streets, and partly perhaps in the personal skill of the
management, none of which are things for which the city is to pay.22
This language indicates that Holmes was concerned that the plain-
tiff had possessed the ability to squeeze profit from the community
through control of vital waters.
One can characterize this concern about the ability to extort
as a moral principle influencing Justice Holmes' decision. Morality
as the meta-legal criterion would impose no duty on the city to
compensate for ending the plaintiff's right to exact profits by con-
trolling an item essential to life. One could go so far as to say it
would be immoral to allow the plaintiff to continue his advantage.
However Justice Holmes would maintain social policy, not
morality, dictated his decision. A law permitting the ending of
tribute has positive social value and should be enforced; or, the
power to extort has negative social value and therefore the law must
end it. And to complete the picture, it is good social policy and con-
sumate morality to return the developer of a water system to status
quo ante when ending the monopoly granted to encourage develop-
ment.
22 Id. at 555. (Emphasis added.)
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The fact is that for the most part, what is generally considered
moral will be damned good social policy. Holmes wanted law and
morality separated to avoid those instances where a particular creed
demanded certain things not necessarily appropriate to society at
large.
The language of Newburyport lends itself to such a pursuit.
In other cases, the language may not make the meta-legal motiva-
tion quite so obvious but a perceptive investigator could, if so in-
clined, find it (see Appendix). This analysis will only rarely go
beyond the opinions themselves to find that standard. However in
one segment, the analysis of Holmes' position on injuries to em-
ployees, The Path Of The Law will have to be used to fully ap-
preciate his position.
B. Morality in Holmes Decisions
The Justice's famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Gunter 2 3 (#13)
is an application of Holmes' meta-legal standard, social worth. Fur-
ther, the opinion contains a specific denial of absolutism and re-
veals the similarity between morality and social value as meta-legal
criteria. In dissenting from the decision to enjoin non-violent labor
picketing, Holmes said:
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of
social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be
attained merely by logic and the general propositions of law which
nobody disputes. Propositions as to policy rarely are unanimously
accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of unanswerable
proof. They require a special training to enable any one even to
form an intelligent opinion about them. In early stages of law, at
least, they generally are acted on rather as inarticulate instincts
than as definite ideas for which a rational defence is ready.2 4
The "inarticulate instincts" Holmes speaks of seem identical
with Fuller's description of where the all-important moral facts
may be found; "They lie not in behavior patterns, but in attitudes
and conceptions of rightness, in the obscure taboos and hidden re-
ciprocities which permeate business and social relations. ' 25 Both
philosophers agree that law is truly controlled by trans-legal phe-
23 167 Mass. 92 (1896).
24 Id. at 106. (Emphasis added.)
25 L. Fuller, supra note 9, at 65.
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nomena which are neither known nor knowable, but only felt. On
this point, one can only concede that the naturalists have raised a
semantic shortcoming in Holmes' naming of the meta-legal crite-
rion. There is no difference in the descriptions of it; nor, most
significantly, as was established earlier, there is no dispute as to the
existence of it.
But let us proceed. In later passages, Holmes uses language
not even the most dogmatic naturalist can dispute. He refers to the
"free struggle for life"26 and says no one can possibly believe that
the struggle is limited to persons of the same class competing for the
same end. Then he speaks in the language of naturalism itself and
says:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on
one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the
necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried
on in a fair and equal way.27
No one can deny the naturalism of these observations. The eternity
of the struggle, the basically selfish end the struggle seeks and the
demand for combination to make the battle equal are all principles
with which naturalists identify.
But more than the language of the opinion speaks to the
naturalism which dictated dissent. Holmes recognized the working-
man's right to the ability to control his own destiny. He was
prompted by his recognition of the worth and dignity of the in-
dividual, regardless of station in life. It is ironic to note that these
same rights were not legislatively enacted as "law" until nearly
forty years later.2s Holmes was painfully aware of the gap between
creed and deed, and dissented to call the majority's attention to it.
His decision was his attempt to establish the confluence of law and
morality; but his reason for doing so was not because it is ordained
that men should so conduct themselves. His reason was simply the
26 167 Mass. 92, 107 (1896).
27 Id. at 108. (Emphasis added.)
28 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141.
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belief that more people would adhere to the law if more people
were treated fairly by it.
In another case (#37) the Justice once again relies on a moral
principle to explain his decision. The case involved a mortgagee's
duty to advertise a foreclosure sale and Holmes said:
The first advertisements are required by the mortgage; any other
duties are less defined, and embraced under the general obligation
to make reasonable efforts to prevent a sacrifice of the- property.
2 9
That the Justice found no duty to advertise does not diminish
the moral basis of the decision. He articulated the mortgagee's
moral duty to prevent sacrifice and found it had been met.
A case involving a manufacturer duplicating the packaging
of his chief competitor reveals another aspect of Holmes' reliance
of trans-legal standards.3 0 He enjoined the manufacturer from con-
tinuing the duplication because the defendant knew a deception
was intended. The Justice said it was immaterial whether the de-
fendant intended deception-it was sufficient that he knew his
customers intended to deceive their customers. The reference to
the intent of the defendant and the equating of guilty knowledge
with the requisite intent are obvious applications of moral prin-
ciples.
An opposite application of the moral requirement of knowl-
edge for liability appears in Brauer v. Shaw31 (#45). Mr. Justice
Holmes simply pointed out:
It would be monstrous to allow an inconsistent act of the offeror,
not known or brought to the notice of the offeree, to affect the
making of the contract; .... 32
The thesis posited earlier, that in fact Justice Holmes artic-
ulated a meta-legal criterion controlling the law in The Path, is
supported by his acts. His decisions, both in word and deed show a
consistent reference to supra-legal standards. At times he even spoke
in naturalistic terms, so that the semantic difference alluded to
earlier may not even exist.
29 Marcus v. Collamore, 168 Mass. 56 (1897).
30 New England Awl v. Marlborough Awl Co., 168 Mass. 154 (1897).
31 168 Mass. 198 (1897).
32 Id. at 200.
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C. Statutory Interpretation
The primary thrust of the "law is a command" criticism is that
legal positivists do not consider the purposes of a statute; but rather
because they regard legislation as an order which must be obeyed,
they apply it literally. Justice Holmes' decisions reveal that he did
not practice this aspect of legal positivism.
In Commonwealth v. Fleekner 3 (#3), the Justice recognized
that legislative purpose was a proper item for judicial considera-
tion. "We should be slow to suppose the legislature meant to take
away the right to undo the disgrace and legal discredit of a convic-
tion . . . merely because a wrongly convicted person has paid his
fine or served his term," he decided.
3 4
A case interpreting the net effect of a city charter and a later
statute shows conclusively Holmes' concern with legislative pur-
pose:
We do not regard the foregoing argument (a literal reading that
refusal to act cannot cause one to be "aggrieved by action") as con-
clusive. We agree that the last of § 20 could be taken in a looser
sense. Arguments from the supposed policy of the Legislature, as
exhibited in a series of charters are even more doubtful. Neverthe-
less the construction which we adopt seems to a majority of the
Court to reach the plan and policy indicated by the charter, and
certainly is in accord with the intent more definitely expressed in
another charter .... 35
As final proof of Holmes' concern with legislative purpose,
we can see his approval of putting desiradatum in the law:
When title to land is dealt with, the intent of the registry laws is
that purchasers should not be required to look beyond the registry
of deeds. . . . Not having been recorded, it (an assignment of
mortgage) is invalid against Emerson by the express terms of the
statute.3 6
These few cases demonstrate that Justice Holmes thought meta-
legal criteria controlled not only the Courts, but the legislature as
well. He did not disapprove of the legislature considering such
matters; nor did he feel judges could not review legislative deter-
33 167 Mass. 13 (1896).
34 Id. at 14.
35 Worcester v. County Commissioners, 167 Mass. 565, 567 (1897).
36 Swasey v. Emerson, 168 Mass. 118, 120 (1897).
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minations of this type. If he had disapproved of such considerations,
he would not have engaged in them.
D. A Valuable Insight
While it may be a mere coincidence (but such seems hard to
believe), there is a most meaningful relation between a passage in
The Path and Holmes' contemporaneous judicial activity. During
the year under scrutiny, he wrote twelve opinions in what we would
describe as Workmen's Compensation cases.17 In only four cases did
Holmes find for the plaintiff-employee, and in each case the trial
court had also found for the injured:"' At first it would seem
that Holmes, by not recognizing the employees' claims, takes a most
positivistic approach to the problem. He seemed unwilling to com-
pensate an employee for the loss of life or limb. He could have
been accused of extending the moral belief in equality of man to
an absurd conclusion; i.e., an employee did not have to work if
he did not wish to assume the risks of the job he undertook. Little
effort is required to find the consumate immorality of these deci-
sions, however little additional insight is gained from superficial
analysis. The fact of the matter, as revealed by The Path, is that
Holmes cast the problem on an even higher moral or meta-legal
plane.
Because he recognized the equities on both sides of the im-
mediate moral issue, Holmes admitted in his address that he was
not prepared to advocate ai definite solution. Surely he sympathized
with the injured employee, but he was likewise aware that addi-
tional moral issues were presented. The immediate moral decision
was choosing between the employer and employee to bear the finan-
cial burden of the injury. Shortsighted moral absolutists on either
side of the issue would be satisfied once this election was made by
. 37 McCann v. Kennedy, 167 Mass. 23 (1896); Clare v. New York And New England
R.R., 167 Mass. 39 (1896); Flaherty v. Powers, 167 Mass. 61 (1896); McKee v. Tourtollotte,
167 Mass. 69 (1896); Young v. Miller, 167 Mass. 224 (1897); Hogarth v. Pocasset Mfg. Co.,
167 Mass. 224 (1897); Whittaker v. Bent, 167 Mass. 588 (1897); Kenneson v. West End
Street Railway, 168 Mass. 1 (1897); Willey v. Boston Electric Light Co., 168 Mass. 40 (1897);
Kanz v. Page, 168 Mass. 217 (1897); Hughes v. Malden and Melrose Gas Light Co., 168
Mass. 395 (1897); Bell v. New York, New Haven &c Hartford R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 443 (1897).
as Flaherty v. Powers, 167 Mass. 61 (1896); McKee v. Tourtellotte, 167 Mass. 69 (1896);
Hogarth v. Pocassett Manufacturing Co., 167 Mass. 224 (1897); Willey v. Boston Electric
Light Co., 168 Mass. 40 (1897).
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the application of their particular moral code. However Holmes,
devoid of the emotional security resulting from intellectual absolu-
tism concerning the surface issue, found greater questions as he
searched for an answer.
First he saw that the true party defendant was not the em-
ployer, but rather society. It was the Industrial Revolution which
had caused the dramatic increase in employment injuries. The
beneficiary of this revolution was society, not simply the particular
industrialist for whom the injured had labored. The industrialist
was merely a conduit through which society received largess of
organized, mechanized manufacture. Thus to Holmes the moral
question became the fairness of requiring the conduit to pay for the
benefits it merely carried to the ultimate beneficiary. However,
though Holmes had his doubts about the fairness of making the
employer compensate in society's stead, he had absolutely no doubt
that the employee was entitled to compensation.
After Holmes the philosopher drew the moral question,
Holmes the pragmatist recognized one answer. He knew that if the
price of progress was placed on the employer it would soon be
shifted to the public through price increases. Although this solu-
tion placed the burden where Holmes thought it ought to be, it did
not completely satisfy him. It failed to meet his demand for com-
plete societal rationality of thought and decision. Society could not
reach an adequate answer about industrial injuries unless it knew
the exact cost of those injuries. It could not know the precise cost
of those injuries if that cost was disguised as a cost of goods. On the
other hand, if the cost of the injury remained with the employee,
society would still bear it through welfare or other forms of charity;
and by bearing the cost in an undisguised form, society would
reach the decision required of it based on a complete, rather than
obscured, understanding of the facts.
Granted, Justice Holmes reached decisions which seem to go
against contemporary moral codes, but that is not cause to damn
him as immoral. Disagreement? Certainly. Immorality? Ridic-
ulous!
Holmes did in fact address himself to a moral question-the
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morality of permitting society to evade its responsibility by shifting
the burden onto one person. To condemn as immoral one who
questions the morality of organized social action rather than private
action, is error. And then to expand this erroneous assessment of
immorality to describe it as the kind of immorality that gives rise
to totalitarianism is a geometric progression of misunderstanding
that creates an irony only Justice Holmes' renowned sense of humor
could appreciate.
The plain truth is that Holmes wanted our society to pay its
own way. Further he demanded that it make the decisions required
of it based on unobscured, undisguised, stark reality. The Justice's
choice is a difficult one for us to accept and no doubt caused him
discomfort. He too was disturbed by the lack of compensation to
the employee. His recognition of the justice of the claims is demon-
strated by his opting for some sort of "tariff for life and limb."3
However his instincts, as well as desiring justice, demanded a
realistic, workable tariff, not one haphazardly fashioned.
The fact that Holmes could go beyond his instinct for justice
at the level of applying principle, to reach the deeper and broader
moral issue existing at the germination of principle; and at this
essential level follow his instincts, regardless of the outcome at the
surface issue, is by no means immorality. By all means, it is a diffi-
cult disciplined decision, but no more difficult or disciplined than
some decisions demanded by other moral codes held by men never
accused of immorality.
Contrary to proving Holmes immoral, his decisions in the
Workmen's Compensation cases prove his devotion to a moral code
beyond the capacity of most men. These twelve decisions read with
pertinent passage in The Path show Holmes required more of man
banded together in a social group than he demanded of them as in-
dividuals. These more stringent standards he imposed on the con-
duct of human government make incredulous any accusation that
Holmes' philosophy could be used to justify any form of despotic
rule. This insight to his moral code explains why he became-to
the surprise of many-one of the original judicial civil libertarians
39 Holmes, supra note 3, at 467.
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when he emerged on the national scene. The "inconsistencies" that
his critics find make him so formidable a philosophic adversary are
truly consistent applications of a code transcending that of his
critics.
IV. Conclusion
Mr. Justice Holmes' philosophy and his acts have been studied
to determine if the flaws found in Legal Positivism appear in his
work. It has been shown that few, if any, do. The goal of con-
temporary Natural Law philosophers is good order through laws
which, by their inherent consumate fairness, promote a high degree
of compliance with themselves. It is accurate to state that Justice
Holmes sought this very same goal.
The only dispute between the Justice and his Naturalist
critics is the means of implanting within law the requisite degree of
fairness. The Naturalists hold that law must prescribe conduct con-
forming to morality in order to promote a sufficiently high degree
of compliance. Justice Holmes however specifically denied morality
as the means of eliciting the desired degree of voluntary compli-
ance; instead he believed only law having value to society could
achieve a high degree of voluntary adherence.
Much effort has been expended exploring this area of con-
flict. Each side intimates that fidelity to the opposite theory is at
best the beginning of the descent to despotism, and at worst such
devotion becomes the jurisprudential justification of totalitarian-
ism.
However, little effort has been directed at an area of funda-
mental agreement of the two schools of thought. Both philosophies
agree that law must conform to some higher standard. The demand
for conformity to a higher standard, regardless of what name is
given that standard, is the significant contribution of both theories
to the prevention of the corruption of power. This demand that
the law itself must comply with supra-legal standards is the penulti-
mate citadel against immoral despotism.
It is unfortunate that the devotees of Natural Law, in the
ardent support of their theory, have overlooked their basic agree-
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ment with the philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes. In this instance it
is doubly unfortunate because their misunderstanding has caused
them to link a man, whose life was committed to the defense of
freedom, with the rationalizations of totalitarianism. No doubt, ob-
serving similar injustices likewise flowing from overzealous fidelity
to particular creeds, contributed to the Justice's distrust of absolut-
ism. However this injustice becomes somewhat tolerable when one
recognizes that it results from a failure to understand the Justice's
thinking. For after all, was it not Holmes' mentor Emerson who
































Meta-Legal or Moral Question
non payment of debts; fresh start for
bankrupts
adultery; sentencing of convicted
felons
right to appeal i.e., right to justice
enforcement of promises
safety of person
evidentiary value of judgment, truth
safety of person
safety of person
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non-payment of just debts
reliance on apparent authority
conscious attempt to mislead public
liability without knowledge
dependency for support
rights of fiduciary's creditors to
entrusted property
safety of person
reliability of oral evidence: truth
will oversight cut off rights
finality of judgments
safety of person







purchase of specific property with
knowledge of rights
defrauding creditors
taking without adequate compensa-
tion
liability without notice
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